Immigration Law as Foreign Relations*

Kevin Cope† & *David Leblang*‡

Much of this Handbook – and immigration legal scholarship generally – analyzes immigration systems of the world from the perspective, stated or unstated, that immigration law has one of three principal aims: to serve the interests of justice, to protect marginalized people, and/or to protect the rights and interests of existing citizens. Other chapters in this *Theoretical and Conceptual Frameworks* part of the Handbook argue that immigration law can be conceived as a form of interior law enforcement (Stumpf), economic regulation (Betts), racial control (K. Johnson), or administrative law (Family) to name a few. Each of these lenses bring valuable insights to the study of immigration law. These perspectives are, we argue, incomplete as immigration law reflects political preferences; to better understand the origins of immigration policy, we have to understand it as a form of international politics, i.e., foreign relations.

As conceptualized here, foreign relations is the process by which a sovereign state strategically interacts with other sovereign states, international organizations, and non-state actors, in an attempt to maximize or maintain its power, security, wealth, or that of its leaders, electorate, and other members of society. Others in this Handbook analyze past (Doyle and Powers) and future (Goldenziel) multilateral cooperation and institutions for immigration. Our focus here is instead on bilateral and plurilateral diplomacy, whether it produces formalized international law or not, which shapes a significant part of domestic immigration law, especially that governing non-immigrant visas.

A predictable early objection to this claim is that immigration law is not an appropriate subject for international politics, given how profoundly immigration policy affects human lives and wellbeing. Rather, the argument might go, immigration law should be governed by a set of universal international standards, neutrally enforced by states and intergovernmental organizations. To be clear, our claim here is descriptive; we take no position here on whether it is moral or otherwise appropriate for states to play international politics with immigration law. We note, briefly, however, that any objection to treating immigration law as a form of foreign relations probably applies with similar force to long-established approaches like the politics of trade, or of monetary policy. While those domains do not regulate human lives as directly as immigration law, they nonetheless also profoundly affect human wellbeing, including that of the most socio-economically disadvantaged.

---

* Early work in progress; please do not cite without permission.

† Associate Professor of Law and Public Policy, University of Virginia.

‡ Ambassador Henry J. Taylor and Mrs. Marion R. Taylor Endowed Professor of Politics, Professor of Public Policy, Director of the Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy's Global Policy Center, University of Virginia.

One goal of this essay is to spur further research into *how* and *why* states use immigration law as a form of foreign relations, drawing perhaps on research designs used to study states' use of other foreign policy tools, such as use-of-force, trade, and monetary policy.

1. Non-Immigrant Visas

To illustrate how immigration law operates as a form of foreign relations, we focus on the use of short-term non-immigrant visas. We therefore first review what exactly a non-immigrant visa is, and how states have used them in recent decades. A non-immigrant visa is a government-issued legal document that gives a foreign national advance permission to enter the country for a stated purpose and for a limited duration. (In contrast, *immigrant* visas authorize the holder to reside in the country permanently or indefinitely.) Obtaining a non-immigrant visa usually involves submitting an application to the destination country's foreign office and paying a fee that often ranges between $10 and $200. In addition to round-trip travel tickets and proof of the trip's purpose, many states require vaccination records and proof of assets, including, occasionally, bank statements translated into the language of the destination country.

After that process, approval is not guaranteed, of course, and many countries deny visa applications for myriad reasons, sometimes providing the applicant little or no justification for the decision. National laws typically give immigration officials wide latitude to accept or deny visa applications. Common bases for rejection include criminal history; a previous overstay; participation in activities (or affiliation with entities) considered a threat to national security; inability to show protection from certain diseases through vaccination; insufficient resources to afford food and lodging during the stay (forcing the traveler to engage in unauthorized work)[4]; and insufficient assets to return home (increasing the risk of overstay).

Some states categorically allow nationals of some countries to travel to the country without advanced permission, at least for tourism, short business trips, and some other short visits. Yet visa-free travel across corridors remains the exception rather than the norm. As of 2017, a comprehensive dataset of visa policies revealed that approximately 73 percent of all country pairs featured visa restrictions. Despite increasing human mobility and trade liberalization over the last few decades, the incidence of visa restrictions has remained surprisingly stable over that same period (Czaika et al. 2017). Indeed, visa-free travel exists mainly between geographically proximate countries that participate in a regional trade or other agreements. There are numerous exceptions to this generalization, however. Importantly, roughly a quarter of all country dyads have no visa requirements (Czaika et al. 2017).

When many hear about immigration law national-original discrimination, they may think first of the policies of decades past, including in the United States, where immigrant visas/permanent residence was limited or banned for nationals of regions considered less desirable, like East Asia, Southern Europe, and Eastern Europe. Or they may think of how

[4] "British tourists' fury as they discover they must be able to prove they can spend £85 a day to enter Spain due to Brexit" Mail Online, 7/26/22, at https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-11049249/British-tourists-able-prove-spend-85-day-enter-Spain.html.

18 states ban Israelis (and some ban those who have traveled to Israel), how 16 states do not accept Somalia passports, or of the United States' 2017 ban on travelers from several Muslim-majority states. Some of these policies have been widely condemned as unjustly discriminatory, and in many cases, racist. Yet nationality discrimination continues in *most* states under visa waiver provisions and other discriminatory short-term visa policies, generally without serious criticism.

2. Theories of Visa Policy

States have been using immigration law, and particularly non-immigrant visa policy, to discriminate among visitors on the basis of nationality for over a century (e.g., Torpey 1998). For instance, to make a short-term trip to a particular destination, nationals of some countries must first complete a lengthy application, provide medical records, travel to an interview at the destination state's local consulate, and pay the equivalent of hundreds of U.S. dollars. Visitors from other origin countries need only show up at an immigration checkpoint with a valid passport. Why and how do different states make this distinction?

There are several explanations. Perhaps the most obvious one – which we term the *protection* model – is that destinations perceive a greater risk from some nationals—of overstaying, of competing for employment or national resources, of committing violence, of carrying disease, or of otherwise creating discord—than from others. States therefore perform time- and resource-intensive screening of some potential visitors. Another explanation – the *deterrent* model – suggests that states concerned about undesirable visitors may use a visa like a "sin tax," making the process sufficiently difficult that some would-be visitors go elsewhere or stay home. A third possibility – the *revenue* model – says that states use the visa fee principally as a revenue-raising tariff, basing it on citizens' anticipated demand and willingness to pay.

In a systematic analysis of visa-free travel policies, Mau et al. (2015) identify a "global mobility divide" in 2010, with state members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (wealthy states) enjoying wide and growing visa-free access, and poorer states enjoying far less (and shrinking) visa-free access (see also Neumayer 2006). Mau et al. are not able to identify the specific cause of this divide, but a few explanations are plausible. It could be that states are wary of poorer states' screening and information infrastructure, so they insist on conducting their own, whereas states can access criminal and other data on foreign nationals from wealthier states more quickly and easily. Another explanation is that states value travelers from wealthier countries more, since they expect them to have more resources to spend in the destination, and so they use visas to deter visitors from less wealthy states.

In the rest of this section, we consider these three potential explanations for visa policies generally.

A. The Protection Model

The fact that countries prefer long-term immigrants from some countries over those from others is well-documented (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Sniderman et al. 2004). Differences in demand for short-term (especially non-labor) migrants are less-well researched and understood. Nonetheless, we can reasonably infer that some of the factors that shape immigrants' desirability also apply to short-term non-immigrants. Destinations seem to perceive a greater risk from some nationals—of overstaying, of competing for employment or national resources, of committing violence, of carrying disease, or of otherwise creating discord—than from others. States therefore perform time- and resource-intensive screening of those suspect potential visitors.

Perhaps the primary protective reason for applying restrictive visa policies toward nationals of another state is the perception that those nationals generally represent a greater security threat than nationals of some other states (Avdan 2014). Though states are perhaps generally just as concerned about things like insufficient assets or disease, those things can more easily be assessed on an individual basis at a point of entry; proof of vaccination, negative tests (in the case of COVID-19), and proof of assets and return travel can usually be analyzed more quickly and accurately than a person's potential threat to national security. Where individual assessment is costly or impractical, decisionmakers of all sorts tend to resort to group-based discrimination.[5]

Requiring visas of some types of migrants, such as those from certain countries, serves an obvious protective function: would-be entrants who must apply for a visa generally receive greater scrutiny than those who are not required to do so. While in most cases, countries retain the formal legal right to deny entry at the border even if no visa is required, in practice, visa-free travel makes it very likely that a person who wants to visit the country can do so. Indeed, in places that have dismantled internal physical checkpoints like the Schengen Area, inter-country travel is nearly guaranteed in practice. In contrast, imposing visa requirements gives a country greater access to information about the traveler and extra time to investigate her background. This raises the likelihood that immigration officials will discover something about the visa applicant that would disqualify her from entry: certain forms of criminal history, connections with organizations considered a national security threat, or likelihood of carrying certain infectious diseases, for example. In this sense, the visa serves as a screening device against foreigners the country deems undesirable, for whatever reason.

[5] A study of state visa policies finds that, although such security concerns are a key motivator for state visa policies, they can be overcome by economic dependence, especially where the security threat is less direct (Avdan 2014). Avdan finds that both economic interdependence and perceived security threats from non-state actors (i.e., private citizen visa-seekers) influence state visa policies. Which of the two is more important, Avdan finds, depends on whether the nature of the perceived threat from the sending country's nationals. Where they are considered a threat to the country's territory or citizens, security concerns trump economic ones; where the threat is more indirect, such as to the receiving country's policy interests abroad, the reverse is true.

B. The Deterrent Model

The second potential immigration-control purpose of instituting a visa requirement on certain nationals is to deter some people from seeking a visa in the first place. For migrants who possess qualities deemed undesirable, but which the state is unable or unwilling to explicitly screen out (e.g., religion, language, ethnicity), formal screening does little. In that case, implementing visas on a nationality might work to deter formally qualified foreign nationals from entering. States might do this in order to reduce the number of travelers from a certain country whose nationals are deemed less desirable. In this sense, states concerned about undesirable visitors may use a visa like a "sin tax," making the process sufficiently difficult that some would-be visitors go elsewhere or stay home.

Indeed, the supply of short-term visitors appears to be generally elastic. That is, where a state raises even minor barriers to entry, especially through the imposition of a visa requirement, the number of people who successfully travel to that country drops significantly (Czaika and deHass 2016; Czaika and Neumayer 2017; Lawson and Roychoudhury 2016). Czaika and Neumayer (2017) find that the imposition of visa requirements on the nationals of a given country reduces travel by about 20 percent. Using an earlier dataset, Lawson and Roychoudhury (2016) find an even stronger effect: a 70 percent decrease in travel from the visa-restricted country. Whatever the precise figure, this effect comes principally from deterrence, rather than legal prohibition. The overwhelming majority of this decrease occurs from eligible but discouraged would-be travelers who do not attempt to obtain a visa.

Of course, countries usually have the formal power, at least under international law, to ban nationals of a given country altogether. But this may be politically costly or impossible, both from a foreign relations standpoint (because it is likely to harm the target-country's citizens and provoke its leaders) and from a domestic political standpoint (because activists, affected communities, and political opponents may attack the move as unjustly discriminatory). Given the significant reduction in entrants that states can achieve by imposing a visa, states may find that option strategically preferable.

As an example of this phenomenon, consider the case of the travel restrictions that the United States imposed on several Middle Eastern countries in the mid-2010s. The Visa Waiver Program Improvement and Terrorist Travel Prevention Act of 2015 (2015 Visa Act) was passed by Congress and signed by President Obama. It listed seven countries: those then deemed state sponsors of terrorism under federal law (Iran and Sudan), as well as Iraq and Syria; Libya, Somalia, and Yemen were added later. Under the 2015 Visa Act, nationals of the listed countries who could otherwise travel visa free (such as those who were dual nationals with a country eligible for the visa-waiver program), and certain people who had traveled there were no longer eligible for the visa waiver. They could still apply for a visa, and, if granted, travel to the United States, but the 2015 Visa Act made that more difficult for this set of foreign nationals. Some affected groups and 33 House Democrats objected to

the measure, [6] but it did not generate widespread public opposition, and it triggered no litigation.

In 2017, President Trump issued an executive order that referenced the countries implicated by the 2015 Visa Act but purported to fully "suspend entry into the United States, … of … aliens from" those countries (Iraq, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen). The order triggered widespread protest and bipartisan condemnation, including, for example, from some Republicans in Congress, Republican national security experts, and Pope Francis. The ban was enjoined by federal courts. It was eventually upheld by the Supreme Court, but only after two revisions, which diluted some but not all of its harshest effects.[7] Why the dramatically different reaction between the 2015 law and the 2017 executive order? First, candidate Donald Trump had made anti-Muslim animus a centerpiece of his campaign, and there was substantial evidence that that animus had largely or completely motivated the executive order; there were no such allegations concerning the development of the 2015 Visa Act. Second, while the 2015 act both stigmatized and posed a serious inconvenience to many nationals of Middle East states, in most cases, it did not prevent them from entering the United States, while President Trump's travel ban did just that for a much larger set of people (including, briefly, many U.S. lawful permanent residents).

The 2015 Visa Act and Trump travel ban illustrate why merely imposing a visa requirement might be more attractive to a country interested in scrutinizing, and ultimately, reducing the number of, travelers from a certain set of countries. In short, visas can be an effective deterrent for foreigners interested in entering the country. Policymakers are certainly aware of this when setting visa policy.

C. The Revenue Model

A third possibility – the revenue model – holds that states use the visa fee as a revenue-raising tariff, basing it on citizens' anticipated demand and willingness to pay. In the realm of longer-term visas and citizenship, many states practice a form of explicit price discrimination, but at the individual rather than national level. For example, the Commonwealth of Dominica offers citizenship to individuals who have never lived in the country for a contribution of as little as $100,000 USD. Italy offers a permanent residence visa for an investment of at least €250,000 in an "innovative" Italian start-up company, or for a €2 million investment in Italian government bonds.

Likewise, if states were to rationally use short-term visas as a source of revenue, we would expect them to behave like profit-maximizing firms offering a service in a marketplace: the set price (down to and including no cost) would depend in part on the demand for the product (travel to the country) and the consumers' anticipated willingness to pay. We would therefore expect that, all other things equal, countries with much to offer

[6] "Iranian Americans dismayed by discrimination in new visa regulations," Guardian, Jan. 15, 2016, at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jan/15/iranian-americans-visa-regulations-waiver-programme-us-immigration.

[7] Trump v. Hawaii (2018).

visitors – whether short-term business and employment, contact with residents, or tourism – would be more likely to require visas and to charge more for them. In contrast, all other things equal, countries that are considered less-desirable destinations will charge relatively little or nothing, in the form of visa-free travel.

We would also expect that, again, all other things equal, wealthier countries would see their own nationals being charged more than nationals who on average have less ability to pay. Of course, ceteris paribus is a strong assumption here! The reality is that all other things are not equal, as nationals of richer countries are likely considered more desirable travelers; the host probably expects them to invest more in the host economy and to commit fewer crimes (whether or not that is true in reality). If these expectations do exist, and if a country expands its notion of revenue to include the financial costs and benefits imposed on its society, then it is not so clear that a rational state with these expectations would indeed wish to impose greater costs in the form of visas on wealthier nations.

We believe that, of the three theories discussed thus far, the revenue model is likely to prove the least influential factor in states' short-term visa policymaking. To see why, consider the fees associated with visas from certain countries in Table 1 below.

Table 1 - Visa Application Fees and Visa Durations for U.S. Nationals in 2022, by Country[8]

Country	Cost	Duration	Country	Cost	Duration
Vietnam	$130	3 months	Thailand	$20	60 days
Laos	$35	30 days	Bangladesh	$130	60 days
Cambodia	$20	30 days	Indonesia (Bali)	$25	30 days
Armenia	$35	30 days	Tanzania	$100	90 days
Azerbaijan	$100	30 days	Iran	$80	20 days
Turkmenistan	$71	10 days	Türkiye	$30	90 days
Uzbekistan	$100	30 days	Egypt	$15	30 days
Kazakhstan	$25	30 days	Ethiopia	$50	30 days
Kyrgyzstan	NV	60 days	Uganda	$50	30 days
Tajikistan	$65	30 days	Tanzania	$100	5 years
China	$120	60 days	Rwanda	$30	30 days
Burma	$30	30 days	India	$190	10 years
India	$90	6 months	Haiti	$10	30 days
Nepal	$40	30 days	Australia	$15	90 days
China	$160	30 days	Brazil	$45	2 years
Bolivia	$135	5 years	Madagascar	$37	30 days
Paraguay	$65	Life of passport	Comoros Islands	€30	45 days
Jordan	$30	30 days	Nepal	$25	15 days
			Thailand	$20	60 days

There exists significant variation in visa policies between states that we might expect are comparably desirable short-term destinations. For example, while Uzbekistan charges U.S. nationals $100 for an e-visa, Kyrgyzstan does not require a visa. Likewise, Vietnam and Bangladesh each charge $130, while Thailand and Indonesia charge only $20 and $25, respectively. These are just a few examples, but they are typical of how visa policies often bear little or no relationship to the apparent desirability of a destination. While maximizing revenue may affect visa policies on the margins, it appears not to be a significant driver of policy.

3. The Foreign Relations Model

Yet another explanation – potentially complementary to the others – has little to do with perceived harm, reducing entries, or expected revenue: destinations use state-based visa requirements as a tool of foreign relations. For states that are attractive destinations for business or leisure, state visa policies decide whether to burden visitors from any given country with millions of dollars of expense and countless hours of time and hassle. As with

[8] Uncornered Market, "Visa Fees by Country from Traveling Around the World," at https://uncorneredmarket.com/visa-costs-travel-around-the-world/.

other foreign policy instruments like trade barriers, monetary policy, or intelligence cooperation, the threat of imposition serves to deter other states from adverse measures (in kind or unrelated), to retaliate for those already taken, or as a bargaining chip. They may also sometimes be part of a "two-level game," in which leaders attempt to signal toughness to their key constituencies for foreign states' real, perceived, or anticipated slights.

The various literatures concerned with migration have not recognized immigration law as an instrument of foreign relations nearly to the extent they have, for instance, treated immigration law as an instrument of national protection, of global inequality, or of economic regulation. Nor, to our knowledge, have any empirical studies attempted to measure to what extent states use visas for that purpose. Despite the relative lack of academic work on the topic, it is well-known that many states use a formal or informal policy insisting on some degree of reciprocity with other states on non-immigrant visa rules. For example, U.S. federal law provides, "the Secretary of State shall, insofar as practicable, accord to [eligible foreign] nationals the same treatment upon a reciprocal basis as such foreign country accords to nationals of the United States who are within a similar class."[9] These policies have little or nothing to do with protecting the country from a certain type of nationality, or with deterring their entry, or with raising revenue. Instead, they exist to exert political leverage over foreign states, to punish them for restrictions on their own nationals and reward them for lifting such restrictions.

To be clear, our claim is not that the other explanations for states' immigration legal policy that discriminate by nationality are incorrect or unhelpful; they all likely explain at least some state behavior, perhaps quite a bit of it. Rather, it is also useful to conceptualize immigration law decision-making as a form of foreign relations, because a significant part of it is not primarily rights-based, or national-security-oriented, or economic, or even domestic politics, but instead simply foreign and international relations.

A. Examples

Diplomats often negotiate over visa rules with their foreign counterparts, much as they would over trade, security, or monetary policy. For instance, as Israel deported thousands of Ukrainians during the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, Ukraine threated that if Israel did not relax its requirements, Ukraine would instate its own visa requirements on Israelis, including on the thousands of pilgrims who travel every Rosh Hashanah to the Ukrainian city of Umam.[10]

---

[9] 8 U.S.C. § 1201(c)(2); *see also* 8 U.S.C. § 1351 ("The fees for the furnishing and verification of applications for visas by nonimmigrants of each foreign country and for the issuance of visas to nonimmigrants of each foreign country shall be prescribed by the Secretary of State, if practicable, in amounts corresponding to the total of all visa, entry, residence, or other similar fees, taxes, or charges assessed or levied against nationals of the United States by the foreign countries of which such nonimmigrants are nationals or stateless residents . . . .").

[10] "Ukraine threatens 'reciprocity' to Israeli travelers over refugee policy", at https://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/diplomacy/1656394711-ukraine-threatens-reciprocity-to-israeli-travelers-over-refugee-policy

State negotiations over immigration policy are not confined to the subject of non-immigrant visas. In 2016, Türkiye and the European Union reached a deal that involved Türkiye's taking millions of refugees; one of Türkiye's key demands was that Turkish nationals would receive visa-free travel into the EU, before and regardless of whether it became a member state (Ozdemir-Ayata 2017). The deal was generally seen as critical to the future of the European Union. As one commentator put it, "What happens if the agreement fails? ... [T]he Western Balkans turn into a battleground for migrants, smugglers, border guards, soldiers and vigilante groups, destabilising an already fragile region. And ever larger numbers begin to arrive again in Central Europe. Such a scenario would be a devastating blow to those leaders in Europe who argued that it is possible to have a humane and effective EU policy on border management while respecting the refugee convention.''[11] Notably, in this agreement, the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, the main global legal instruments for refugee protection, were relative bystanders. Those institutions most certainly allow European countries to return refugees to Türkiye, and they do not require Türkiye to provide permanent residence in the country. Their explicit terms prohibit *refoulement*, the return of refugees to places where their life or freedom would be threatened. But within that narrow prohibition, states' acceptance of people seeking refuge is largely a matter of international diplomacy.

As another example, U.S. nationals have long enjoyed visa-free entry into European Union Member States. The United States has mostly but not completely reciprocated; nationals of Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Poland, and Romania are not eligible for the U.S. Visa Waiver Program. Frustrated with the lack of movement on this issue, in 2018, the European Commission considered reimposing visa requirements on U.S. nationals, but ultimately declined to. Notably, as of 2022, the United States remained the only state whose nationals enjoyed visa-free entry into EU member states, but who did not fully reciprocate for the EU's 27 member states' nationals.[12] It is not so surprising that, if one state were going to be exempted from the EU's reciprocity rules, it would be the world's largest economy and sole military superpower.[13]

---

[11] See, e.g., "Newsletter of the European Stability Initiative" (Oct. 11, 2016). *See also* Cope and Crabtree (2020).

[12] "EC discusses visa-reciprocity with US – decides against imposing visa requirements", at https://www.schengenvisainfo.com/news/ec-discusses-visa-reciprocity-with-us-decides-against-imposing-visa-requirements/.

[13] Similar dynamics played out between the Solomon Islands, on one hand, and Australia and New Zealand, on the other; like the United States, both countries have been able to ignore the Solomon Islands' requests for reciprocity, given the discrepancy in relative importance of the others' travelers to each country. "Solomon Islands seeks reciprocal Visa Waiver from Australia and New Zealand" https://www.sibconline.com.sb/solomon-islands-seeks-reciprocal-visa-waiver-from-australia-and-new-zealand/. Canadians cannot use India's e-visa system; India cites the lack of visa-exemption reciprocity. Yet Indian citizens do not qualify for the U.S. Visa Waiver Program either, but U.S. citizens can use the e-visa system (which, though formally classified as visa procurement, is functionally much like the U.S. Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) in burden to the traveler even though is styled as a system for visa-exempt nationalities). https://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/india-continues-to-bar-canadians-from-getting-e-visas-10-year-tourist-visas-101648803840428.html.

Visa policy has even been used as a tool of international economic and monetary policy. During the COVID-19 pandemic, Türkiye increased the number of states whose nationals enjoyed not only visa-free, but passport-free travel (requiring only national identity cards) to 18, 15 of whom imposed visas on Turkish citizens.[14] A main rationale was the need for foreign currency to stimulate the Türkiye tourism sector as the country struggled to recover from the pandemic.

Finally, the U.S. Congress was motivated to enact the 2015 Visa Act by a protective concern: those who might have been radicalized there in one of the seven Muslim-majority countries, but who would escape visa scrutiny by virtue of their dual nationality with a European or other Visa Waiver Program state. One criticism of the measure was the fear that it would trigger reciprocal measures, especially by European Visa Waiver Program states, who saw a large number of their own nationals harmed by the act.[15]

B. Implications

These are just a few illustrations of how immigration law is substantially motivated by states' desire to maintain their standing in the global order. But what is gained by recognizing immigration law as a form of foreign relations?

[to come]

4. Conclusion

[to come]

[14] Levent Kenez, "Turkey in need of foreign currency, grants passport-free entry to more foreign citizens," Nordic Monitor, July 29, 2022, at https://nordicmonitor.com/2022/07/turkey-in-currency-crisis-grants-passport-free-entry-to-more-foreign-citizens/. The 18 states are Germany, Belgium, France, Georgia, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, Italy, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Ukraine, Greece, Poland, and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

[15] Alan Yuhas, "New US visa rules could also cause problems for Americans visiting Europe," Guardian, Jan 21, 2016, at https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jan/21/new-us-visa-rules-could-also-cause-problems-for-americans-visiting-europe.

5. References

1. Avdan, Nazli. "Controlling access to territory: Economic interdependence, transnational terrorism, and visa policies." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58, no. 4 (2014): 592-624.

2. Brown, Liam. "The invisible barriers of Schengen: A quantitative research on the EU's visa-issuing practises." (2020).

3. Czaika, Mathias, Hein de Haas, and María Villares-Varela. "The global evolution of travel visa regimes." *Population and Development Review* 44, no. 3 (2018): 589.

4. Czaika, Mathias, and Hein de Haas. "The effect of visas on migration processes." *International Migration Review* 51, no. 4 (2017): 893-926.

5. Czaika, Mathias, and Eric Neumayer. "Visa restrictions and economic globalisation." *Applied Geography* 84 (2017): 75-82.

6. De Haas, Hein, Mathias Czaika, Marie-Laurence Flahaux, Edo Mahendra, Katharina Natter, Simona Vezzoli, and María Villares-Varela. "International migration: Trends, determinants, and policy effects." *Population and Development Review* 45, no. 4 (2019): 885-922.

7. Freeman, Gary P. "Modes of immigration politics in liberal democratic states." *International migration review* 29, no. 4 (1995): 881-902.

8. Gracheva, Camila, Leonid Polishchuk, Koen JL Schoors, and Alexander Yarkin. "Institutions and Visa Regimes." *Higher School of Economics Research Paper No. WP BRP* 114 (2015).

9. Hainmueller, Jens, and Michael J. Hiscox. "Educated preferences: Explaining attitudes toward immigration in Europe." International organization 61, no. 2 (2007): 399-442.

10. Karaman, Abdullah S. "The pernicious impact of visa restrictions on inbound tourism: The case of Turkey." *Turkish Studies* 17, no. 3 (2016): 502-524.

11. Laube, Lena. "The relational dimension of externalizing border control: selective visa policies in migration and border diplomacy." *Comparative Migration Studies* 7, no. 1 (2019): 1-22.

12. Lawson, Robert A., and Jayme S. Lemke. "Travel visas." *Public Choice* 153, no. 1 (2012): 17-36.

13. Luedtke, Adam, Douglas G. Byrd, and Kristian P. Alexander. "The politics of visas." *Whitehead J. Dipl. & Int'l Rel.* 11 (2010): 147.

14. Mau, Steffen, Fabian Gülzau, Lena Laube, and Natascha Zaun. "The global mobility divide: How visa policies have evolved over time." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41, no. 8 (2015): 1192-1213.

15. Moufakkir, Omar. "What's immigration got to do with it? Immigrant animosity and its effects on tourism." *Annals of Tourism Research* 49 (2014): 108-121.

16. Neumayer, Eric. "Unequal access to foreign spaces: how states use visa restrictions to regulate mobility in a globalized world." *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 31, no. 1 (2006): 72-84.

17. Özdemir, Zelal, and Ayşe Güneş Ayata. "Dynamics of exclusion and everyday bordering through Schengen visas." *Political Geography* 66 (2018): 180-188.

18. Shin, Adrian J. "Tyrants and migrants: Authoritarian immigration policy." *Comparative Political Studies* 50, no. 1 (2017): 14-40.

19. Sniderman, Paul M., Louk Hagendoorn, and Markus Prior. "Predisposing factors and situational triggers: Exclusionary reactions to immigrant minorities." *American political science review* 98, no. 1 (2004): 35-49.

20. Sykes, Alan O. "International cooperation on migration: Theory and practice." *U. Chi. L. Rev.* 80 (2013): 315.

21. Torpey, John. "Coming and going: On the state monopolization of the legitimate "means of movement"." *Sociological theory* 16, no. 3 (1998): 239-259.

22. Tyldum, Guri. "Limitations in research on human trafficking." *International Migration* 48, no. 5 (2010): 1-13.

23. Vezzoli, Simona, Maria Villares-Varela, and Hein De Haas. "Uncovering international migration flow data: Insights from the DEMIG databases." (2014).

24. Wilkes, Rima, Neil Guppy, and Lily Farris. ""No thanks, we're full": Individual characteristics, national context, and changing attitudes toward immigration." *International Migration Review* 42, no. 2 (2008): 302-329.

25. Wright, Chris F. "Why do states adopt liberal immigration policies? The policymaking dynamics of skilled visa reform in Australia." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 41, no. 2 (2015): 306-328.

26. Wright, Matthew, Morris Levy, and Jack Citrin. "Public attitudes toward immigration policy across the legal/illegal divide: The role of categorical and attribute-based decision-making." *Political Behavior* 38, no. 1 (2016): 229-253.